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Automated verification of security protocols based on dynamic root of trust, typically relying on protected
hardware such as TPM, involves several challenges that we address in this paper. We model the semantics
of trusted computing platforms (including CPU, TPM, OS, and other essential components) and of associated
protocols in a classical process calculus accepted by ProVerif. As part of the formalization effort, we introduce
new equational theories for representing TPM specific platform states and dynamically loaded programs.
Formal models for such an extensive set of features cannot be readily handled by ProVerif, due especially
to the search space generated by unbounded extensions of TPM registers. In this context we introduce a trans-
formation of the TPM process, that simplifies the structure of the search space for automated verification, while
preserving the security properties of interest. This allows to run ProVerif on our proposed models, so we can
derive automatically security guarantees for protocols running in a dynamic root of trust context.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Related work 2
3 Preliminaries 4
3.1 Trusted computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2 ProVerif process calculus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4 Formalisation 7
4.1 Cryptographic primitives and platform constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2 Dynamically loaded programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3 Platform state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4 Read and write access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.5 Communication channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.6 The trusted platform module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.7 Dynamic root of trust: launch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.8 Dynamic root of trust: execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.9 Security properties in the formal model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5 Process transformation for automated verification 14
5.1 Sketch of correctness proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6 Verification 17
7 Further work 18
A Operational semantics of the process calculus 21
ar
X
iv
:1
70
1.
08
67
6v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  7
 M
ar 
20
17
2 Automated verification of dynamic root of trust protocols
B ProVerif code 21
1 Introduction
A hardware root of trust, including dynamic measurement of programs and their protected execution, is a promising
concept for ensuring the integrity of a platform and the privacy of sensitive data, despite powerful software attackers
[19]. This relies on the idea that hardware is more difficult to compromise than software, and therefore, it can play
a crucial role in protocols for handling sensitive data. When a secure computing platform is needed, a special
sequence of instructions allows for a trusted piece of hardware to attest the integrity of the software to be run and
to give access to data in a protected environment.
However, turning this idea into a secure design and implementation is not easy, as various attacks have shown
[13, 29]. For more assurance, one could use models and tools that allow automated verification of desired properties
against trusted computing protocols and implementations. One main challenge for automated verification is the
size and number of components involved in running programs protected by a dynamic root of trust. Furthermore,
messages of such protocols consist not only of data, but also of programs that are to be executed on the platform,
and that can be supplied by an attacker or by an honest participant. At the same time, modelling the platform
configuration registers (PCR) of the trusted platform module (TPM) [20] poses problems, because PCRs can be
extended an unbounded number of times. Even the most efficient symbolic methods struggle with the structure of
the resulting search space [6, 12].
Our contributions. We propose a formal model in the ProVerif process calculus [7] for the technology and
for the security properties of a dynamic root of trust (as instantiated by Intel’s Trusted Execution Technology or
AMD’s Secure Virtual Machine). Our model is more realistic than [12] and it covers aspects of trusted computing
that [10] does not cover (section 4). We show how a platform state can be naturally represented as a term in ProVerif
(or applied pi-calculus [1, 27]) and how operations on the platform state can be expressed as equations in a term
algebra (sections 4.3 and 4.4). Furthermore, we show how to model the dynamic loading of protected programs.
Our model is simple and does not require heavy encodings, being based on the classic idea of processes as data,
with a twist to take protection into account (section 4.2).
We propose a new abstraction to model the extension of PCR registers that allows automated verification for
a larger class of protocols than in [12]. We show how to over-approximate the model of the TPM such that the
structure of the search space is simplified, without losing possible attacks or introducing false attacks. The main
idea is that we can let the attacker set the PCR to any value, as long as it is “big enough” (section 5).
Putting the formalisation and the abstraction together, we obtain the first automated verification for a realistic
model of a dynamic root of trust. As security properties, we prove code integrity (the PCR values correctly record
the measurement of the platform) and secrecy of sealed data (only a designated program can access data that has
been sealed for its use in a protected environment).
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Cas Cremers and several reviewers for helping improve this work.
2 Related work
A programming language and a logic for specifying trusted computing protocols and properties are proposed in
[10]. The setting is quite expressive and it allows the analysis of protocols similar to the ones that we study in this
paper. [10] does not consider the seal/unseal functions of the TPM, but their language could be extended to capture
them. However, the formal analysis of [10] is manual, and considering the complexity of the proofs involved, the
lack of automation can be a limitation. We also believe some of their axioms (like those linking the PCR values
to a late launch action) could be decomposed into more atomic formulas, in closer relation to the computational
platform. Their security properties include correctly reading PCR values and the ability of honest parties to launch
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roots of trust; our property of code integrity, modeled as a correspondence assertion, can be seen as an additional
constraint for these two events.
The analysis of [12] is automated with ProVerif and is based on a Horn clause model. Microsoft’s Bitlocker
protocol is shown to preserve the secrecy of data sealed against a static sequence of PCR values. Their model
considers a static root of trust, and cannot handle dynamically loaded programs. Furthermore, there is no way to
express a program that has access to data in a protected environment. Without a richer model of platform states,
code integrity properties cannot be expressed either. To help with automation, [12] shows that, for a specific class
of Horn clauses, it is sound to bound the number of extensions of PCR registers. Since our model is in applied
pi-calculus and our security properties are different, we cannot directly rely on their result, and we propose a new
way of handling the unbounded PCR extension problem.
Information-flow security and computational models. [14] presents a secure compiler for translating programs
and policies into cryptographic implementations, distributed on several machines equipped with TPMs. A computa-
tional model capturing functionalities similar to ours, in conjunction with additional features such as authenticated
key exchange, was recently proposed in [5]. Our models are more abstract, yet could be related to particular
implementations - a closer connections between formal and computational models could be explored in future.
Unbounded search space. Several works tackle the problem of an unbounded search space for automated
verification, but technically they are all based on principles that cannot be translated to PCR registers. In [25],
it is shown that, for a class of Horn clauses, verification of protocols with unbounded lists can be reduced to
verification of protocols with lists containing a single element. In [9], it is shown that to analyse routing protocols
it is sufficient to consider topologies with at most four nodes. These are strong results, based on the fact that the
elements of a list or the nodes in a route are handled uniformly by the protocol. Similar results, in a different
context, are shown in [16, 15]. Their reductions are based on the principle of data independence for memory stores.
In [22] and respectively [2], it is shown how to handle an unbounded number of Diffie-Hellman exponentiations
and respectively reencryptions in ProVerif. Surprisingly, the underlying associative-commutative properties of
Diffie-Hellman help in [22], while [2] can rely on the fact that a re-encryption does not change the semantics
of a ciphertext. Another case where an unbounded number of operations is problematic is file sharing [8]. In
order to obtain an automated proof, [8] assumes a bound on the number of access revocations, without providing
justifications for soundness. A sound abstraction for an unbounded number of revocations, in a more general
setting, is proposed in [24]. Still, it is specialized to databases and it seems to rely on the same principle as several
results mentioned above: it does not matter what the data is, it only matters to what set it belongs.
Tools and models for non-monotonic state. StatVerif [3] is aimed specifically for the verification of protocols
relying on non-monotonic states, encoding the semantics of applied pi-calculus enriched with states into a set of
Horn clauses for input to ProVerif. Tamarin [28] is based on multiset rewriting and inherently allows specification
and automated reasoning for non-monotonic states, where the set of facts can both augment and decrease. SAPIC
[21] takes as input a stateful variant of applied pi-calculus and produces a multiset-based model, which is then
analysed using Tamarin.
StatVerif [3], SAPIC [21], and Tamarin directly [23], have been used with success to verify security protocols
that rely on non-monotonic states or trusted hardware: PKCS]11 for key management [26], YubiKey for user
authentication [32], and protocols for contract signing [17]. Our models, on the other hand, are tailored for direct
input to ProVerif, while extending the scope of formal models for platform state operations and dynamic root of
trust protocols based on a TPM [18, 19, 20]. It is one of our main interests for future work to see how the models of
this paper can be analysed with tools like [28, 21, 3], in order to obtain a closer alignment with the state semantics
of real systems.
4 Automated verification of dynamic root of trust protocols
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Trusted computing
We first describe the required computing platform (hardware and software) and then describe the considered class
of dynamic root of trust protocols.
A. Computing platform. We consider a general purpose computing platform equipped with a CPU and a TPM
(both trusted), as well as a generic untrusted operating system.
Trusted hardware. Trusted computing relies on the CPU and the TPM1 to perform certain operations whose
integrity cannot be compromised by any software attacker. Regarding the TPM, two of its trusted features are
fundamental for the applications that we consider in this paper: the ability to record a chain of values in its platform
configuration registers (PCR) and the ability to seal data against specified values of the PCR.
The TPM allows the PCR to be reset only by the CPU or by a system reset. On the other hand, the PCR can be
extended with any value by software. If a PCR records a value p and is extended with a value v, the new value of the
PCR is h((p,v)), i.e. the result of applying a hash function to the concatenation of p and v. Crucially, these are the
only two ways in which the values of a PCR can be modified. The role of the PCR for the protocols that we consider
in this paper is to store the measurement of programs, recording a chain of loaded programs. When data d is sealed
against some specified value v of the PCR, the TPM stores d internally and can release it in future only if the value
recorded in its PCR matches the value v against which d was sealed.
For the purpose of formal verification, we are flexible about who exactly of the CPU or the TPM is doing a
trusted operation, like measuring, sealing, etc. This depends on the implementation, e.g., the Intel SGX can do all
the operations of a TPM. Changing the formalization from this paper to fit a particular implementation should be
easy.
Privileged software. When a system interrupt is triggered (e.g by network communication or user interface
action), all physical memory can be accessed by the system management interrupt (SMI) handler. This means that
any memory protection mechanism, in particular the protocols that we consider in this paper, must either disable
interrupts for their whole duration (not practical in general) or else rely on the fact that the SMI handler cannot be
compromised. That is why the SMI handler is stored in a memory area called SMRAM, which enjoys special hardware
protection. Still, as shown in [13, 29], the security guarantees of trusted computing can be violated using the CPU
caching mechanism to compromise the SMI handler. Roughly, these attacks work because the protection of the
SMRAM is not carried on to its cached contents. A countermeasure against such attacks, that we also adopt in this
paper at an abstract level, is a software transfer monitor (STM) [18]. It also resides in the SMRAM, but it cannot be
cached while a dynamic root of trust is running (special registers of the CPU should ensure that), and its role is to
protect some memory regions from the SMI handler.
B. Dynamic root of trust. We consider the technology of dynamic measurement and protected execution,
also called dynamic root of trust (DRT), as instantiated for example in Intel’s Trusted Execution Technology
(TXT) or AMD Secure Virtual Machine (SVM), and as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The goal of DRT is to establish a protected execution environment for a program, where private data can be
accessed without being leaked to an attacker that controls the operating system. Assume a program, that we
will call PP (called measured launch environment on Intel and secure kernel on AMD), needs to be loaded
in a protected environment. The first entry point of the DRT protocol is a trusted instruction of the CPU (called
GETSEC[SENTER] on Intel and SKINIT on AMD), that takes as input the program PP. To help with the establishment
of a protected environment, the CPU also receives as input another program, that we will call INIT (called SINIT
authenticated code module on Intel and secure loader on AMD). The DRT launch and execution sequence
can then be summarized as follows:
1. The CPU receives a request from the operating system containing the INIT code and the PP code. The system
interrupts are disabled at this step, as an additional protection against untrusted interrupt handlers.
1See recent book [4] detailing the TPM version 2.0 specification and implementations.
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Figure 1: Execution flow in a Dynamic Root of Trust (DRT)
2-3. A software attacker that controls the operating system could compromise INIT and the STM, and that is why the
CPU computes their measurement and extends the result into the TPM, to keep a trace of programs responsible
for the DRT. Measuring a program means applying a hash function to its source code. This computation is
performed on the CPU and is trusted, entailing that the resulting value is a correct measurement of INIT and
STM. The CPU communicates with the TPM on a trusted channel and requests that the PCR is reset and extended
with the resulting value (h(INIT),h(STM)).
4-7. The INIT program is loaded and it computes the measurement of the PP program, extending it into the PCR.
The communication between INIT and the TPM is performed on a private channel established by the CPU.
INIT also allocates protected memory for the execution of PP and loads it.
8. The PP program can re-enable interrupts once appropriate interrupt handlers are set. Furthermore, it can now
request the TPM to unseal data that has been sealed against the current PCR value, and it can have access to
that data in a protected environment. The communication between PP and the TPM is performed on a private
channel established by the CPU.
9. Before ending its execution, the PP program extends the PCR with a dummy value, to record that the platform
state is not to be trusted any more.
Since the OS is untrusted it can supply malicious programs INIT and PP. Therefore, INIT, PP and the STM are
not trusted, but they are measured. If their measurement does not correspond to some expected trusted values, this
will be recorded in the TPM and secret data will not be unsealed for this environment.
Security goals. Let us summarize the two main security goals of the DRT.
Code integrity: In any execution of the platform, if the measurements recorded in the PCR value of the TPM
correspond to the sequence of programs PINIT, PSTM, PPP, then the platform is indeed running a DRT for the
protected execution of PPP in the context of PINIT and PSTM. In particular, this means that the programs PPP,
PINIT andPSTM cannot be modified while a DRT is running.
Secrecy of sealed data: Any secret data that is sealed only against a PCR value recording the sequence of
programsPINIT,PSTM,PPP, is only available for the programPPP, in any execution of the platform.
3.2 ProVerif process calculus
We review ProVerif [6, 7] and the special way in which we use (a restriction of) its input calculus in our modelling.
6 Automated verification of dynamic root of trust protocols
A. Terms, equational theories and deducibility. We consider an infinite set of names, a,b,c,k,n . . ., an infinite
set of variables, x,y,z, . . . and a possibly infinite set of function symbols F . Names and variables are terms; new
terms are built by applying function symbols to names, variables and other terms. We split F into two disjoint
sets of public functionsF pub and private functionsF priv. Public functions can be applied by anyone to construct
terms, including the attacker, whereas private functions can be applied only as specified by the protocol. When
F priv is not explicit, we assume that all functions are public.
A substitution σ is a partial function from variables to terms. The replacement of every variable x with xσ in
a term T is denoted by Tσ . A context is a term C [ ] that contains a special symbol in place of a subterm. For
a context C [ ] and a term T , we denote by C [T ] the term obtained by replacing with T in C [ ]. For any formal
objectD , we denote by sig(D) the set of function symbols appearing inD , and by top(T ) the outer-most function
symbol in term T .
En equational theory E is defined by a set of rewrite rules U1→ V1, . . . ,Un→ Vn, where U1, . . . ,Un,V1, . . . ,Vn
are terms with variables. A term U rewrites to V in one step, denoted by U → V , if there is a context C [ ], a
substitution σ and an index i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that U = C [Uiσ ] and V =C[Viσ ]. Several rewrite steps from U to V
are denoted by U →∗ V . We consider only convergent equational theories, i.e., for any term T there exists a unique
non-reducible term T↓ s.t. T →∗ T↓. We write U =E V iff U↓=V↓. ProVerif also allows operations on sequences:
for all n, from any terms T1, . . . ,Tn, one can derive the term (T1, . . . ,Tn), and conversely.
Deduction. Given an equational theory E , a set of terms S and a term T , the ability of an attacker to obtain T
from S is captured by the deduction relation S `E T (or simply S ` T when E is understood) defined as being true
iff:
• there exists a term T ′ ∈ S such that T ′ =E T , or
• there are terms T1, . . . ,Tn such that S`E T1, . . . ,S`E Tn and a function symbol f ∈F pub such that f (T1, . . . ,Tn) =E T
B. Processes and operational semantics.
Processes of the calculus are built according to Fig. 2. Replication spawns instances of a process: !P is formally
equivalent with P | !P. Names introduced by new are called bound or private; they represent the creation of fresh
data. Names that are not bound are called free, or public. The term T in an input in(U,T ) allows to specify filters
for messages received on U : a message M will be accepted only if there is a substitution σ such that M = Tσ .
A variable x is free in a process P if P neither contains x in any of its input patterns nor does it contain any
term evaluation of the form x = T . Consecutive term evaluations can be written together as let (x1, . . . ,xn) =
(T1, . . . ,Tn) in P. The notions of substitution, contexts and normal forms translate to processes as expected.
Operational semantics is defined as a transition system on configurations of the form (N ,M ,P), where: N
is a set of fresh names created during the execution of a process;M is the set of terms made available to the attacker;
andP is the set of processes executing in parallel at a given point in time. We write (N ,M ,P)→∗ (N ′,M ′,P ′)
if the configuration (N ′,M ′,P ′) can be reached from (N ,M ,P) in zero or more executions steps. Such a
sequence of execution steps is called a trace of P.
C. Security properties. The ability of an attacker to learn a term T by interacting with a process P is denoted by
P |= Att(T ), defined as true iff there exists a process Q, with sig(Q)∩F priv= /0, such that (Ninit, /0,{P |Q})→∗
(N ′,M ′,P ′) andM `E T , for some configuration (N ′,M ′,P ′). Intuitively, Q represents any computation that
can be performed by the attacker.
P,Q,R ::=
0 null process
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
newn;P name restriction
in(U,T );P message input on U
out(U,T );P message output on U
if U =V then P else Q conditional
let x = T in P term evaluation
Figure 2: Process algebra, with n a name, x a variable, and T,U,V terms.
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A (simplified) correspondence assertion [7] is a formula of the form
Att(T ) =⇒ f alse or Att(T ) =⇒ (U =V ).
For a correspondence assertion Att(T ) =⇒ Φ as above, we have
P |= Att(T ) =⇒ Φ iff ∀σ . [ (P |= Att(Tσ)) =⇒ Φσ ]
Correspondence assertions of the first type model the secrecy of T , while those of second type enforce the
constraint U =V for deducible terms matching the pattern T (typically the terms U,V will share variables with T ).
4 Formalisation
Our formal specification for the trusted computing platform and protocols described in section 3.1 assumes an
attacker that controls the operating system and can execute a DRT any number of times, with any INIT and PP
programs. Moreover, using the CPU cache, the attacker can compromise the STM and SMI handler, and use them
to access protected memory. The attacker has access to all TPM functions. However, we assume that the attacker
cannot compromise the CPU nor the TPM, and that the platform state can only be modified according to the equations
that we present in section 4.4.
We model a system state as a term that can be updated by the CPU process, the TPM process and, once it has been
output on a public channel, by the attacker. Multiple system states can be explored in parallel by the attacker, whose
knowledge monotonically accumulates the set of all reachable states. This is an abstraction with respect to a real
platform, where the CPU and the TPM have their own internal state, part of a global, non-monotonic system state.
We also have a simplified model of TPM sealing: in reality, it relies on encryption with a TPM private key and refers
to a specific system state; in our model, it is represented by the pair of public/private functions seal/unseal. For
unsealing, the TPM process will require the input of a system state and check that the corresponding unseal request
is valid for that state.
4.1 Cryptographic primitives and platform constants
To model cryptographic primitives and various constants on the platform state, we consider the signature Fdata,
whereF privdata = {unseal/2} and
F pubdata = {ps/0,pd/0,true/0,false/0,h/1,senc/2,sdec/2,seal/2}.
We also consider the set of rewrite rules Edata:
sdec(senc(xval,xkey),xkey) → xval
unseal(seal(xval,xpcr),xpcr) → xval
The constant pd (resp. ps) represents the result of a dynamic (resp. static) PCR reset. A dynamic reset marks the
start of a dynamic root of trust, and can only be performed by the CPU. The functions senc and sdec, and the
corresponding rewrite rule, model symmetric key encryption. The symbol h represents a hash function. Anyone
can seal a value, while the corresponding rewrite rule and the fact that unseal is private ensure that a value can be
unsealed only according to the specification of the TPM.
4.2 Dynamically loaded programs
To model the fact that arbitrary programs can be dynamically loaded on the platform state (e.g. for the roles of
INIT and PP), we consider a new public function symbol prog/1 and an infinite signature of private constants
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FP , containing a different constant nP for every possible process P. Intuitively, the term prog(nP) is a public and
unique identifier for the program P. In a computational model, such an identifier can for example be obtained by
hashing the source code of P. The first action of a process that models a program will be to output the corresponding
program identity prog(nP) on a public channel.
On the other hand, the constant nP represents a private entry point for the program P. Specifically, we consider
a private function get entry and the rewrite rule get entry(prog(x))→ x. The idea is that a trusted loader of
programs (the CPU in our case) has access to the private function get entry and, using this rewrite rule, it can
gain access to the private entry point of any program. Now, nP can play the role of a private channel between
the trusted loader and the loaded program. Furthermore, we can store program identifiers in the platform state, to
record what programs are loaded. Then, we can rely on nP to model the ability of certain loaded programs to affect
the platform state (shown in section 4.4). We denote by Eprog the equational theory defined in this subsection:
Fprog = {prog/1}∪FP , Eprog = {get entry(prog(x))→ x}.
4.3 Platform state
To model a platform state, we consider the signature:
Fstate = {state/4,tpm/1,cpu/2,smram/2,drt/3}
where all the symbols ofFstate are private. This ensures that a platform state can be constructed or modified only
according to the specification, relying on equations that we present in subsection 4.4. Intuitively, a term of the form
state( tpm(TPCR),cpu(TINT,TCACHE),smram(TSTM,TSMIH),drt(TINIT,TPP,TLOCK))
represents a platform state where:
• TPCR is a term that represents the value of the PCR register of the TPM;
• TINT is the value of a register of the CPU showing if interrupts are enabled;
• TCACHE represents the contents of the CPU cache;
• TSMIH represents the program for the SMI handler and STM represents the STM program, which are located in
SMRAM;
• TLOCK is showing if a dynamic root of trust is running;
• TINIT represents the INIT program;
• TPP represents the protected program PP.
4.4 Read and write access
The read access is universal: any agent who has access to a platform state
state(tpm(TPCR),cpu(TINT,TCACHE),smram(TSTM,TSMIH),drt(TINIT,TPP,TLOCK))
can read any of its components relying on the public unary function symbols
Fread = {pcr,int,cache,stm,smi,init,pp,lock}
and associated rewrite rules:
pcr(state(tpm(y),x1,x2,x3)) → y
int(state(x1,cpu(y1,y2),x2,x3)) → y1
cache(state(x1,cpu(y1,y2),x2,x3)) → y2
init(state(x1,x2,drt(y1,y2,y3),x3)) → y1
pp(state(x1,x2,drt(y1,y2,y3),x3)) → y2
lock(state(x1,x2,drt(y1,y2,y3),x3)) → y3
stm(state(x1,x2,x3,smram(y1,y2))) → y1
smi(state(x1,x2,x3,smram(y1,y2))) → y2
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The write access to the platform state is restricted by the equational theory described and illustrated in Fig. 3,
where tpm acc and cpu acc are private constants and all other new symbols are public.
PCR. Only the TPM can reset, extend or set the value of the PCR. This capability of the TPM is modeled by the private
constant tpm acc, which will be used only in the TPM process, described later in Fig. 4.
INT. The interrupts can be enabled or disabled by the CPU, whose capability is modeled by the private constant
cpu acc. Additionally, if a DRT is running, then the corresponding protected program PP also has the ability
Figure 3: Write access to the platform state
PCR
INT
CACHE
STM
SMI
INIT
PP
LOCK
Platform state
TPM
CPU
OS
write access
conditional write access
reset(state(tpm(y),x1,x2,x3),tpm acc,ps)→ state(tpm(ps),x1,x2,x3)
reset(state(tpm(y),x1,x2,x3),tpm acc,pd)→ state(tpm(pd),x1,x2,x3)
extend(state(tpm(y),x1,x2,x3),tpm acc,v)→ state(tpm(h((y,v))),x1,x2,x3)
set pcr(state(tpm(y),x1,x2,x3),tpm acc,v)→ state(tpm(v),x1,x2,x3)
set int(state(x1,cpu(y1,y2),x2,x3),cpu acc,v)→ state(x1,cpu(v,y2),x2,x3)
set int(state(x1,cpu(y,z),x2,drt(z1,prog(z2),true)),z2,v)
→ state(x1,cpu(v,z),x2,drt(z1,prog(z2),true))
cache(state(x1,cpu(y1,y2),x2,x3),v)→ state(x1,cpu(y1,v),x2,x3)
flush stm(state(x1,cpu(y1,v),smram(z1,z2),drt(w1,w2,false)))
→ state(x1,cpu(y1,v),smram(v,z2),drt(w1,w2,false)))
flush smi(state(x1,cpu(y1,v),smram(z1,z2),x2))
→ state(x1,cpu(y1,v),smram(z1,v),x2)
set init(state(x1,x2,x3,drt(y1,y2,y3)),cpu acc,v)
→ state(x1,x2,x3,drt(v,y2,y3))
set pp(state(x1,x2,x3,drt(y1,y2,y3)),cpu acc,v)
→ state(x1,x2,x3,drt(y1,v,y3))
set pp(state(x1,x2,x3,drt(prog(y1),y2,y3)),y1,v)
→ state(x1,x2,x3,drt(prog(y1),v,y3))
set pp(state(x,cpu(true,z),smram(prog(z1),prog(z2))),drt(y1,y2,y3)),(z1,z2),v)
→ state(x,cpu(true,z),smram(prog(z1),prog(z2)),drt(y1,v,y3))
set lock(state(x1,x2,x3,drt(y1,y2,y3)),cpu acc,v)
→ state(x1,x2,x3,drt(y1,y2,v))
set lock(state(x1,x2,x3,drt(y1,prog(y2),y3)),y2,v)
→ state(x1,x2,x3,drt(y1,prog(y2),v))
set lock(state(x,cpu(true,z),smram(prog(z1),prog(z2)),drt(y1,y2,y3)),(z1,z2),v)
→ state(x,cpu(true,z),smram(prog(z1),prog(z2)),drt(y1,y2,v))
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to enable or disable interrupts. This is modeled in the second set int equation, by relying on the fact that, if
prog(x) represents the public identity of a program (as explained in section 4.2), then x represents a private
entry point for that program. Therefore, we can use x to model the ability of prog(x) to change certain
elements of the platform state when it is loaded.
CACHE. Any values can be cached. The cache values can then be copied into the contents of the SMI handler and,
when a DRT is not running, into the STM component of the state.
INIT. Only the CPU has the ability to load an INIT program on the platform.
PP. The PP program can be loaded by the CPU (the first equation for set pp) or by an INIT program, if the latter is
already loaded on the platform (the second equation for set pp). Furthermore, the SMI in conjunction with
the STM can also modify the PP program, if the interrupts are enabled (the third equation for set pp).
LOCK. Similarly, the DRT lock can be set/unset by the CPU, by the running PP, or by the SMI in conjunction with
the STM, if the interrupts are enabled.
We denote by Estate the equational theory defined in this subsection.
4.5 Communication channels
The public constant os models a communication channel for platform states and other messages that may be
intercepted, modified or provided by the intruder as inputs to the CPU or the TPM. A private constant cpu tpm
models the secure channel between the CPU and the TPM. A private function tpm ch models the ability of the CPU
to establish a private channel between a loaded program and the TPM. Generally, these channels will be of the form
tpm ch(prog(t)) and the CPU will send this term both to the program represented by prog(t) (on channel t) and
to the TPM (on channel cpu tpm). We also use message tags that will be clear from the context.
4.6 The trusted platform module
We model the TPM by the process in Fig. 4. A PCR reset request can come either from the CPU, and then the PCR is
reset to the value pd marking a dynamic root of trust, or else from the operating system. A PCR extend request can
come from the CPU, from the operating system or from a private channel that the CPU can establish between the TPM
and some other process. To unseal a value, the TPM relies on the value of the PCR registers recorded in the platform
state that is associated to an unseal request. The corresponding equation for unseal ensures that this operation
will succeed only if the PCR values from the state match the PCR values against which plain data was sealed. If a
DRT is running, we perform the unseal for the protected program PP, on the private channel tpm ch(pp(p f state));
otherwise, the unsealed value is made public on channel os.
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TPM = !TPMRESET | !TPMEXTEND | !TPMUNSEAL
TPMRESET = let (ch,rv)=(cpu tpm,pd) in !PCRRESET |
let (ch,rv) = (os,ps) in !PCRRESET
PCRRESET = in(ch,(reset req,nonce,pf state));
let new st = reset(pf state,tpm acc,rv) in
out(ch,(reset resp,nonce,new st))
TPMEXTEND = let ch = cpu tpm in !PCREXTEND |
let ch = os in !PCREXTEND |
! (in(cpu tpm,(ext channel,ch)); !PCREXTEND)
PCREXTEND = in(ch,(extend req,nonce,pf state,v));
let new st = extend(pf state,tpm acc,v) in
out(ch,(extend resp,nonce,new st))
TPMUNSEAL = in(os,pf state);
if lock(pf state) = true then
let ch = tpm ch(pp(pf state)) in UNSEAL
else let ch = os in UNSEAL
UNSEAL = in(ch,(tag unseal,blob));
let v = unseal(blob,pcr(pf state)) in
out(ch,(tag plain,v)))
Figure 4: The TPM process
4.7 Dynamic root of trust: launch
The procedure for launching a dynamic root of trust, i.e. steps 1-7 from Fig. 1, is modeled by the processes CPU and
INIT, from Fig. 5. The CPU receives a request including the INIT and PP programs and the platform state where
the DRT is to be launched. If a DRT is not already running in the corresponding platform state, then the CPU disables
the interrupts and sets the DRT lock (step 1). Next, the CPU measures the INIT and STM programs and extends the
result into the PCR (steps 2-3). In step 4a, the INIT program is loaded and we use the term tpm ch(init) to model
an established private channel between the TPM and the running INIT program. We use the program abstraction
introduced in section 4.2 to model the loading and the execution of INIT, relying on the private constant Tinit. In
turn, the loaded INIT program measures the PP program, records the measurement into the TPM, and loads PP on
the platform state (steps 4b-7a). After the INIT program has measured the PP program and loaded it into memory,
the CPU gets back the new platform state and sets up the private channel for communication between the loaded PP
and the TPM (step 7b).
4.8 Dynamic root of trust: execution
We illustrate the execution of a trusted PP program with an example in Fig. 6, where step 8 is an example of some
useful execution of PP, i.e., unsealing and decrypting, whereas the rest is behaviour we expect from any protected
program. The private constant Tpp represents the private entry point of PP according to the model from section 4.2.
In Fig. 7 we consider a fresh symmetric key kpp and assume that this key has been sealed against the mea-
surement of the trusted PP program, with identity prog(Tinit), of the trusted INIT program, with identity
prog(Tinit), and of the trusted STM program, with identity prog(Tstm). This is represented by the term sealed key
in the process DATA (see the code in the figure below), which we publish on the channel os. We also assume that
some private message hipp is encrypted with kpp and senc(hipp,kpp) is made publicly available on channel os.
In the context of a DRT, the program PP should be able to unseal the key kpp, decrypt and publish hipp. Before
the execution of PP ends, the DRT lock is set to false, and also the PCR is extended with a dummy value in order to
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CPU= ! (*** The CPU process ***)
(* Step 1: receive a DRT request *)
in(os,(drt req, init,pp,pf state))
if lock(pf state) = false then
let s′0 = set int(pf state,cpu acc,false) in
let s0 = set lock(s′0,cpu acc,true) in
(* Step 2: measure INIT and the STM *)
let measure = (h(init),h(stm(pf state))) in
(* Step 3: reset and extend the PCR *)
newnonce;out(cpu tpm,(reset req,nonce,s0));
in(cpu tpm,(reset resp,nonce,s1));
out(cpu tpm,(extend req,nonce,s1,measure));
in(cpu tpm,(extend resp,nonce,s2));
(*Step 4a: load INIT & grant TPM access*)
let s3 = set init(s2,cpu acc, init) in
let einit = get entry(init) in
out(einit,(nonce,s3,tpm ch(init),pp));
out(cpu tpm,(ext channel,tpm ch(init))));
(* Step 7b: establish TPM access for PP *)
in(einit,(drt resp,nonce,new state));
let epp = get entry(pp(new state)) in
out(epp,(new state,tpm ch(prog(epp))));
out(cpu tpm,(ext channel,tpm ch(prog(epp))))
INIT= (*** A trusted INIT program ***)
out(os,prog(Tinit));out(os,prog(Tstm));
(* Step 4b: receive PP and TPM channel *)
in(Tinit,(nonce,pf st, tpmc,pp));
(* Steps 5-6: extend h(PP) into PCR *)
let measure = h(pp) in newnonce1;
out(tpmc,(extend req,nonce1,pf st,measure));
in(tpmc,(extend resp,nonce1,ext st));
(* Step 7a: load PP on platform state *)
let new st = set pp(ext st,Tinit,pp) in
out(exp init,(drt resp,nonce,new st)));
out(os,new st)
Figure 5: DRT process for CPU and INIT
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PP= (* Example of protected program *)
(* Step 7c: launch and get TPM access *)
out(os,prog(Tpp)));
in(Tpp,(pf state0, tpmc));
(* Re-enable interrupts *)
let pf st = set int(pf state0,Tpp,true)
in out(os,pf st);
(* Step 8: unseal and decrypt *)
in(os,xseal);in(os,xenc);
out(tpmc,(tag unseal,xseal));
in(tpmc,(tag plain,xk));
let mess = sdec(xenc,xk) in out(os,mess);
(* Step 9: Ending the execution *)
newrand;out(tpmc,(extend req,rand,pf st,⊥));
in(tpmc,(extend resp,rand,exts));
let ends = set lock(exts,Tpp,false) in
out(os,ends)
Figure 6: DRT execution
leave the PCR in a state which is not to be trusted any more. We verify, in section 4.9, that secret DATA sealed for
this program remains secret.
The SETUP process ties everything together, i.e., it loads and publishes an initial state, and runs any DRT request
from the operating system. We call EXEC, all the processes put together, whereas the TPM is the one providing the
trusted functionalities of reset, extend, and unseal. We use DRT= (TPM | EXEC).
4.9 Security properties in the formal model
Reachability. The reachability of a state in the platform can be expressed as a (non-)secrecy property: a state is
reachable when a corresponding state term can be obtained by the attacker after interacting with the process DRT
modulo the theory Edrt = Edata∪Eprog∪Estate, expressed as a formula of the form
DRT |=Edrt Att(state(Ttpm,Tcpu,Tsmram,Tdrt)).
The property that the DRT= (TPM | EXEC) process can reach an expected state where some trusted programs INIT
and PP have been correctly measured and loaded on the platform can be expressed as follows:
DRT |=Edrt Att(state(
tpm(h((h((pd,v1)),v2))),cpu(true,x),
smram(prog(Tstm),prog(y))
drt(prog(Tinit),prog(Tpp),true)))
where
v1 = (h(prog(Tinit)),
h(prog(Tstm))
v2 = h(prog(Tpp)).
An additional reachability property of interest is whether the program PP has succeeded to unseal the key
kpp, decrypt the private message hipp and output it on the public channel os. This is captured by the following
(non-)secrecy formula:
DRT |=Edrt Att(hipp).
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DATA= (* Seal and encrypt private data *)
newkpp;newhipp;out(os,senc(hipp,kpp));
let sealed key= seal(kpp,hchain) in out(os,sealed key);
(* where hchain= h(h(pd,(h(prog(Tinit)),h(prog(Tstm)))),h(prog(Tpp))) *)
SETUP= (* Launching the system *)
(* Load the initial state *)
in(os,xstm);in(os,xsmi);
out(os,state(tpm(ps),cpu(true,⊥),smram(xstm,xsmi),drt(⊥,⊥,false));
(* Run a DRT with any loaded programs *)
in(os,init);in(os,pp);in(os,pf state);out(os,(drt req,init,pp,pf state));
(* The main processes put together *)
EXEC= ( CPU | ! INIT | SETUP | DATA | ! PP ) DRT= ( TPM | EXEC )
Figure 7: DRT setup and full process.
Code integrity. We say that the trusted platform ensures code integrity if the measurement contained in the PCR
value correctly reflects the state of the platform. Specifically, we require that whenever a dynamic root of trust is
active with a PCR value of pd extended with the expected measurements v1 and v2, then only the corresponding PP,
INIT and STM are running on the platform, and they cannot be modified. This can be expressed by the following
correspondence assertion, which we will denote by Φint in the rest of the paper:
DRT |=Edrt Att(state(tpm(h((h((pd,v1)),v2))),cpu(x,y),smram(xstm,xsmi),
drt(xinit,xpp,true))) =⇒ (xinit,xpp,xstm) = (p1, p2, p3)
where p1 = prog(Tinit), p2 = prog(Tpp), p3 = prog(Tstm).
Note that we ensure the property only for trusted programs. Indeed, if any of PP, INIT or STM are malicious,
they could use their privileges to reach a platform state that does not reflect the PCR values. This is fine, because the
PCR values will correctly record the identity of running programs in the chain of trust. In particular, our property
shows that untrusted DRT programs cannot make the PCR values record the measurement of trusted programs.
Secrecy of sealed data. We also verify that data sealed for PP, i.e. the key kpp, remains secret (we denote this
formula by Φsec):
(Φsec) DRT |=Edrt Att(kpp) =⇒ false.
5 Process transformation for automated verification
ProVerif does not terminate for the DRT process and the equational theory Edrt. The main reason is the rewrite rule
from Estate that allows an unbounded number of PCR extensions, reflecting a problem first noticed in [12]. In this
section, we propose a general transformation of processes that allows a more efficient exploration of the search
space by ProVerif. The transformation is based on a general observation formalised in Proposition 5.1: we can
replace a process P with a process Q as input for ProVerif, as long as Q and P are equivalent with respect to the
security properties of interest. Concretely, we will replace the process DRT with a process DRTb that bounds the
number of PCR extensions, while allowing a direct way for the attacker to set the PCR to any value that is bigger
than the considered bound.
For a process P, let Att(P) = {T | P |= Att(T )} be the set of terms that can be obtained by the attacker when
interacting with P. For a set of termsM , we let Att(M ) = {T |M ` T}. We notice the following.
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Proposition 5.1 Let P,Q be processes and Att(T ) =⇒ Φ be a correspondence assertion such that, for any sub-
stitution σ ,
Tσ ∈ Att(P)rAtt(Q) =⇒ Φσ and Tσ ∈ Att(Q)rAtt(P) =⇒ Φσ .
Then we have: P |= Att(T ) =⇒ Φ if and only if Q |= Att(T ) =⇒ Φ.
The proof of Proposition 5.1 follows immediately from definitions, yet this result is crucial to make our models
amenable for ProVerif. We are thus allowed to transform the process DRT into a process DRTb, that is equivalent to
DRT with respect to code integrity and secrecy properties Φint and Φsec, and whose search space can be handled
by ProVerif. It will be easier to express DRTb using some additional rewrite rules. In conjunction with Proposition
5.1, we will then rely on the following result for soundness and completeness:
Proposition 5.2 LetP be a process, E be an equational theory and Att(T ) =⇒ Φ be a correspondence assertion.
Assume E b is a set of rewrite rules such that ∀U → V ∈ E b : top(U) ∈Fpriv, i.e., is a private symbol. Then we
have:
P |=E Att(T ) =⇒ Φ if and only if P |=E∪E b Att(T ) =⇒ Φ.
Notation. We denoted a term of the form h((. . .h((T0,T1))), . . . ,Tn)) by chain(T0, . . . ,Tn), using chain(T0) for
T0. We define length(chain(T0, . . . ,Tn)) = n, representing the number of extensions of a PCR.
Problematic rewrite rule. We recall the rewrite rule that poses non-termination problems for ProVerif:
extend(state(tpm(y),x1,x2,x3),tpm acc,v)→ state(tpm(h((y,v))),x1,x2,x3)
Intuitively, ProVerif does not terminate because it is unable to make an abstract reasoning about the introduction of
the term h((y,v)) in the right hand side of this rewrite rule. We propose a transformation of the TPM process into a
process TPMb that allows more values to be written into the PCR, overapproximating the effect of the problematic
rewrite rule. This transformation will be sound and complete (satisfying the conditions of Proposition 5.1) based
on the observation that, once it exceeds a certain bound, the value of the PCR does not matter for Φsec and Φint –
thus, we can let the attacker have complete control over it.
Proposed transformation. For a given natural number b, we would like the following behaviour of the TPMb
process: if an extend request is received for a platform state state(tpm(T1),T2,T3,T4) and a value V :
• if the length of the PCR is smaller than b, i.e. length(T1)< b, then execute this request normally, using the func-
tion extend. The updated platform state returned by the TPMb should now be state(tpm(h((T1,V ))),T2,T3,T4).
• if the length of the PCR value T1 is greater or equal to b, i.e. length(T1)≥ b, then output T1 and V to the attacker
and wait for a new value T ′1 as a response. If the length of T
′
1 is big enough, i.e. length(T
′
1) > b, the updated
platform state returned by the TPMb should now be state(tpm(T ′1),T2,T3,T4). In a normal execution, we would
have T ′1 = h((T1,V )). However, the attacker has the choice to set T
′
1 to any value.
Formally, the TPMb process relies on the private function is small to detect if the value of the PCR is lower or
higher than the bound, and treat the two cases differently. The following set of rewrite rules, for all 0≤ i< b, define
is small: is small(chain(v0, . . . ,vi))→ true, where v0 ∈ {ps,pd} and v1, . . . ,vi are mutually distinct
variables. We also need to check if some value to be extended into the PCR is big enough. For this, we introduce
the private function is big, together with the rewrite rule: is big(chain(v0, . . . ,vb+1))→ true, where
v0, . . . ,vb+1 are mutually distinct variables.
The only difference from the normal TPM process is in PCRbEXTEND, which first detects if the current value of the
PCR is small or big: if it is small, the extension process proceeds normally (the process TPMSMALLEXTEND); if it is bigger
than the given bound, then the TPM requests that the operating system combines pcr and val itself (the process
TPMBIGEXTEND). Upon receiving the response from the os, the TPM first checks that the value provided is indeed big (the
compromised operating system may be cheating). Only then, it updates the PCR to the requested value.
We denote by E bdrt the equational theory Edrt augmented with the rules for is small,is big and set pcr
introduced in this section and we assume that these new symbols are private (they are used only by TPMb).
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DRTb = TPMb | EXEC
TPMb = TPM { PCREXTEND 7→ PCRbEXTEND }
PCRbEXTEND = in(ch,(= extend req,nonce, p f state,val));
let pcr = pcr(p f state) in
if is small(pcr) = true then PCRSMALLEXTEND else PCR
BIG
EXTEND
PCRSMALLEXTEND = let new st = extend(p f state,tpm acc,val) in
out(ch,(extend resp,nonce,new st))
PCRBIGEXTEND = out(os,(pcr,val));in(os,new pcr)
if is big(new pcr) = true then
let new st = set pcr(p f state,tpm acc,new pcr) in
out(ch,(extend resp,nonce,new st))
5.1 Sketch of correctness proofs
We have to show that, for Φ ∈ {Φsec,Φint}, we have DRT |=Edrt Φ⇔ DRTb |=E bdrt Φ. We note that soundness
(direction ⇐) is the property that is necessary to derive the security guarantees for DRT, while completeness is
secondary: it explains why we dont get false attacks against DRTb with ProVerif. Since Att(DRT) ⊆ Att(DRTb),
soundness is easy to prove, while completeness requires careful analysis of terms in Att(DRTb)rAtt(DRT). We
show that such terms are roughly limited to what we explicitly release in DRTb: state terms with big PCR values;
they cannot be used by the attacker to violate Φsec and Φint.
First, from Proposition 5.2 and the definition of E bdrt, we can easily translate between Edrt and E
b
drt, thus the
notions and results that follow are modulo E bdrt.
Corollary 5.3 For any Φ, we have DRT |=Edrt Φ⇔ DRT |=E bdrt Φ.
Terms T with top(T )=state are called state terms (or states). For a state term T=state(tpm(T1),cpu(T2,T3),smram(T3,T4),drt(T5,T6,T7)),
we let Comp(T )={T1, . . . ,T7}. For a set of terms M1, we say that a set of state terms M2 is M1-saturated if for
any T ∈M2 we have ∀U ∈ Comp(T ) :M1 `U .
Lemma 5.4 Let M1 be a set of terms and M2 be an M1-saturated set of state terms. Then we have Att(M1 ∪
M2) = Att(M1)∪M2.
Lemma 5.4 formalizes the intuition that, without access to TPM or CPU, the only operation that an attacker can
perform on a state is to extract its components. The proof follows by a straightforward inspection of rewrite rules.
To help in the sequel, we consider several restrictions of attacker’s power against DRTb:
• Att0(DRTb) is the set of terms that can be obtained by an attacker interacting with DRTb, while not being allowed
to use terms in Att(DRTb)r Att(DRT) when constructing inputs for DRTb. That is, Att0(DRTb) can be seen as a
passive attacker with respect to the additional functionality in DRTb.
• Att1(DRTb) is the knowledge of the previous attacker whose power is augmented with the ability to unseal terms
from Att0(DRTb), with TPM UNSEAL, relying on state terms from Att(DRTb)r Att(DRT). This attacker is not
allowed to use terms from Att(DRTb)rAtt(DRT) in any other way.
• Att2(DRTb) is the knowledge of a state respecting attacker against DRTb: the attacker is given unrestricted access
to DRTb and can use any terms from Att(DRTb)rAtt(DRT) to construct his inputs; however, the attacker can only
use state terms according to the specification of an honest behaviour while interacting with the TPM, the CPU, or the
equational theory.
Note that Att0(DRTb) ⊆ Att1(DRTb) ⊆ Att2(DRTb) ⊆ Att(DRTb). We denote by M b the set of state terms
returned to the attacker by the PCRBIGEXTEND process. Note that M
b is an Att(DRT)-saturated set of state terms with
∀T ∈M b : length(pcr(T ))> b.
Lemma 5.5 For any b, we have Att(DRT)⊆ Att0(DRTb)⊆ Att(DRT)∪M b.
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The first inclusion follows easily from the definition of DRTb, which is able to simulate any normal PCR extension
performed by DRT, without access to any terms in Att(DRTb)r Att(DRT). For the second inclusion, relying on
the fact that M b is Att(DRT)-saturated, we use Lemma 5.4 to deduce Att0(DRTb) ⊆ Att(Att(DRT)∪M b) ⊆
Att(DRT)∪M b.
Lemma 5.6 For b≥ 2, we have Att1(DRTb)⊆ Att0(DRTb).
By definition, Att1(DRTb)r Att0(DRTb) ⊆ {U | seal(U,V ) ∈ Att0(DRTb)}. Note that the only sealed term in
Att0(DRT
b) that does not originate from the attacker is seal(kpp,hchain), with length(hchain) = 2. For any
other term seal(U,V ) ∈ Att0(DRTb), we have U ∈ Att0(DRTb), and therefore U /∈ Att1(DRTb)r Att0(DRTb).
From lemma 5.5, the definition of TPMUNSEAL, and the fact that ∀T ∈M b : length(pcr(T )) > b, we also deduce
that kpp /∈ Att1(DRTb)rAtt0(DRTb), so we can conclude Att1(DRTb)⊆ Att0(DRTb).
Lemma 5.7 For b≥ 2, we have Att2(DRTb)⊆ Att1(DRTb)∪M b.
New terms U ∈ Att2(DRTb) come from using a state term V ∈ Att1(DRTb) in TPMRESET,TPMEXTEND or CPU. From
lemmas 5.5 and 5.6, we have either V ∈ Att(DRT) or V ∈M b. In both cases, we can show that U ∈ Att1(DRTb)∪
M b.
Corollary 5.8 For b ≥ 2, we have Att(DRT) ⊆ Att(DRTb) ⊆ Att(DRT)∪M b∪M f , where M f is a set of terms
such that any term T ∈M f contains a state term T ′ with pcr(T ′)> b.
The setM f represents the additional terms that a non state respecting attacker can derive fromM b. The property
ofM f is due to the fact that E bdrt and the DRT
b process do not have effect on state terms that are used outside their
intended scope. Such terms will end up as harmless subterms of attacker’s knowledge.
Corollary 5.9 For b ≥ 2, DRT and DRTb satisfy the conditions of Proposition 5.1 with respect to both Φsec and
Φint.
Corollary 5.8 shows that it is sufficient to check that conditions of Proposition 5.1 are satisfied for terms T in
M b∪M f . For Φsec, this follows from the fact that such terms T are either state terms, or contain state terms, and
therefore the key kpp cannot be among them. For Φint, this follows from the fact that those state terms have PCR
lengths bigger than 2, while the precondition of Φint is a state term with PCR length 2. From Corollary 5.9 and
Proposition 5.1, we deduce:
Corollary 5.10 For Φ ∈ {Φsec,Φint}, we have DRT |=E bdrt Φ⇔ DRTb |=E bdrt Φ.
From Corollaries 5.3 and 5.10, we conclude:
Theorem 5.11 For Φ ∈ {Φsec,Φint}, DRT |=Edrt Φ⇔ DRTb |=E bdrt Φ.
6 Verification
The ProVerif code for the DRTb process and the security properties defined in sections 4 and 5 is available online2. It
uses the equational theory Edata∪Eprog∪E bstate, with b = 2. The verification of each security property terminates
in order of minutes, returning the expected result. From these results (implying there is no attack on DRTb modulo
E bdrt) and from Theorem 5.11 (implying there is no attack on DRT modulo Edrt), we derive:
Theorem 6.1 The DRT process satisfies, modulo Edata ∪Eprog ∪Estate, the properties of code integrity and data
secrecy defined in section 4.9.
2www.dropbox.com/s/cvq4op3w106868t/drt.pi (using ProVerif version 1.85).
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In order to check the reachability properties DRT |=Φ defined in section 4.9, we give ¬(DRT |=Φ) as input query
for ProVerif - an attack with respect to this query would be a witness trace for the desired reachability property.
When returning such a trace, ProVerif can either confirm that it is valid (attack found) or cannot confirm it. Our
models fall in the latter case, and we have to further inspect the output trace to see how its steps can be used to
reconstruct a valid trace: we do observe in the output trace the expected intermediary messages on the channels
cpu tpm and os, and we can follow the source of these messages up to a dynamic root of trust request, of whose
validity we have to again make sure. By a similar analysis of attack traces returned by ProVerif, we can observe
the attacks of [13, 29] in our models, when we allow the STM to be modified arbitrarily.
7 Further work
While our model takes into account at an abstract level the attacks and mitigations of [13, 29], further refinements
and soundness results are necessary in order to be able to conclude that attacks such as these or as [31, 30] are
not possible in practice. We need to develop models that are abstract enough to allow clear specifications and
automated reasoning, and realistic enough to capture for instance implementation flaws. We plan to see how the
models of this paper can be expressed in richer frameworks like StatVerif [3] and SAPIC [21], in order to capture
more closely the state semantics of real platforms. We think the process transformation that we have presented in
section 5 is an instance of a more general result, whose exploration would also be fruitful for future applications.
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(NIL) (N ,M ,P ∪{0})→ (N ,M ,P)
(BANG) (N ,M ,P ∪{!P})→ (N ,M ,P ∪{P, !P})
(PAR) (N ,M ,P ∪{P | Q})→ (N ,M ,P ∪{P,Q})
(NEW) (N ,M ,P ∪{newn;P})→ (N ∪{n′},M ,P ∪{P})
where n′ /∈N
(COMM) (N ,M ,P ∪{out(U,T );P , in(U,A);Q})→ (N ,M ′,P ∪{P,Qσ ↓})
where σ is such that T =E Aσ and
ifM `E U, thenM ′ =M ∪{T}; else,M ′ =M
(IFT) (N ,M ,P ∪{if U =V then P else Q})→ (N ,M ,P ∪{P})
if U =E V
(IFF) (N ,M ,P ∪{if U =V then P else Q})→ (N ,M ,P ∪{Q})
if U 6=E V
(LET) (N ,M ,P ∪{let x = T in P})→ (N ,M ,P ∪{P[x 7→ T ] ↓})
if T ↓ does not contain destructors
Figure 8: Operational semantics
A Operational semantics of the process calculus
B ProVerif code
(***
ABBREVIATIONS:
DRT - DYNAMIC ROOT OF TRUST
DRT_INIT - THE SINIT (INTEL) OR SLB (AMD) PROGRAM
DRT_PP - THE PROTECTED PROGRAM: MLE(INTEL) OR SK(AMD)
***)
param reconstructTrace = false.
(*CHANNELS*)
free os. (* PUBLIC CHANNEL FOR THE OPERATING SYSTEM CONTROLLED BY THE INTRUDER *)
private free cpu_tpm. (* PRIVATE CHANNEL FOR THE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CPU AND TPM *)
private fun tpm_ch/1. (* tpm_ch(x) REPRESENTS A PRIVATE CHANNEL USED BY
A PROGRAM x TO COMMUNICATE WITH TPM *)
(*CRYPTO*)
fun h/1. (* HASH FUNCTION *)
fun senc/2. (* SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION *)
reduc sdec(x,senc(x,y)) = y.
fun ps/0. (* STATIC RESET VALUE OF THE PCR *)
fun pd/0. (* DYNAMIC RESET VALUE OF THE PCR *)
fun false/0. fun true/0. (* BOOLEAN VALUES *)
(* TPM SEAL/UNSEAL*)
fun seal/2.
private reduc unseal(seal(xpcr,xvalue), xpcr) = xvalue.
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(* STATE STRUCTURE: state(tpm(PCR),cpu(INT,CACHE), drt(INIT,PP,LOCK),smram(STM,SMI) *)
private fun state/4. private fun tpm/1. private fun cpu/2.
private fun drt/3. private fun smram/2.
(*EXAMPLE STATE:
state(tpm(pd),cpu(true,false), drt(program(expected_init),program(expected_pp),true),
smram(program(expected_stm),program(expected_smih)))
*)
(* PRIVATE CONSTANTS FOR THE PRIVILEGED ACCESS THAT
THE CPU AND TPM HAVE TO THE PLATFORM STATE *)
private fun cpuAccess/0. private fun tpmAccess/0.
(* ABSTRACTION FOR DYNAMICALLY LOADING PROGRAMS*)
fun program/1.
private reduc getENTRY(program(x)) = x.
(*** ACCESSING THE PLATFORM STATE ***)
reduc getPCR (state(tpm(y),x1,x2,x3)) = y.
reduc getINT(state(x1,cpu(y1,y2),x2,x3)) = y1.
reduc getCACHE(state(x1,cpu(y1,y2),x2,x3)) = y2.
reduc getINIT(state(x1,x2,drt(y1,y2,y3),x3)) = y1.
reduc getPP(state(x1,x2,drt(y1,y2,y3),x3)) = y2.
reduc getLOCK(state(x1,x2,drt(y1,y2,y3),x3)) = y3.
reduc getSTM (state(x1,x2,x3,smram(y1,y2))) = y1.
reduc getSMIH (state(x1,x2,x3,smram(y1,y2))) = y2.
(*** MODIFYING THE PLATFORM STATE + ABILITIES OF LOADED PROGRAMS ***)
(* TPM *)
reduc resetPCR (state(tpm(y),x1,x2,x3),tpmAccess,pd) =state(tpm(pd),x1,x2,x3);
resetPCR (state(tpm(y),x1,x2,x3),tpmAccess,ps) =state(tpm(ps),x1,x2,x3).
reduc
(*** PROBLEMATIC EQUATIOn *)
extendPCR(state(tpm(x),x1,x2,x3), tpmAccess, value) =
state(tpm(h((x,value))),x1,x2,x3).
(***)
reduc setPCR(state(tpm(y),x1,x2,x3),tpmAccess,value) =state(tpm(value),x1,x2,x3).
reduc isSMALL(pd) = true;
isSMALL(ps) = true;
isSMALL(h((pd,y))) = true;
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isSMALL(h((ps,y))) = true.
reduc isBIG(h((h((h((x,y)),z)),w))) = true.
(* CPU *)
reduc setINT(state(x1,cpu(y1,y2),x2,x3),cpuAccess,value) = state(x1,cpu(value,y2),x2,x3);
setINT(state(x1,cpu(y1,y2),drt(z1,program(z2),true),x2),z2,value) =
state(x1,cpu(value,y2),drt(z1,program(z2),true),x2).
reduc cache(state(x1,cpu(y1,y2),x2,x3),value) = state(x1,cpu(y1,value),x2,x3).
reduc flush_smi(state(x1,cpu(y1,y2),x2,smram(z1,z2))) =
state(x1,cpu(y1,y2),x2,smram(z1,y2)).
reduc flush_stm(state(x1,cpu(y1,y2),drt(w1,w2,false),smram(z1,z2))) =
state(x1,cpu(y1,y2),drt(w1,w2,false),smram(y2,z2)).
(* TO OBTAIN THE ATTACK, ADD THE EQUATION: *)
(* flush_stm(state(x1,cpu(y1,y2),x2,smram(z1,z2))) = state(x1,cpu(y1,y2),x2,smram(y2,z2)). *)
(* DRT *)
reduc setINIT(state(x1,x2,drt(y1,y2,y3),x3),cpuAccess,value) =
state(x1,x2,drt(value,y2,y3),x3).
reduc setPP(state(x1,x2,drt(y1,y2,y3),x3),cpuAccess,value) =
state(x1,x2,drt(y1,value,y3),x3);
setPP(state(x1,x2,drt(program(y1),y2,y3),x3),y1,value) =
state(x1,x2,drt(program(y1),value,y3),x3);
setPP(state(x1,cpu(true,z),drt(y1,y2,y3),
smram(program(z1),program(z2))),(z1,z2),value)=
state(x1,cpu(true,z),drt(y1,value,y3),smram(program(z1),program(z2))).
reduc setLOCK(state(x1,x2,drt(y1,y2,y3),x3),cpuAccess,value) =
state(x1,x2,drt(y1,y2,value),x3);
setLOCK(state(x1,x2,drt(y1,program(y2),true),x3),y2,value)=
state(x1,x2,drt(y1,program(y2),value),x3);
setLOCK(state(x, cpu(true,z),drt(y1,y2,y3),
smram(program(z1),program(z2))),(z1,z2),value)
=state(x,cpu(true,z),drt(y1,y2,value),smram(program(z1),program(z2))).
(** MESSAGE TAGS **)
free drt_request,drt_response,pcr_extend_request,pcr_extend_response,
pcr_reset_request,pcr_reset_response, drt_start, tag_unseal, tag_plain, ext_channel.
(* FUNCTION FOR CREATING NONCES *)
private fun fnonce/1.
let DRT_CPU = (* GET A DRT REQUEST FROM THE OPERATING SYSTEM *)
in(os, (=drt_request, drt_init, drt_pp, pf_state));
(* ONLY ACCEPT THE REQUEST IF NOT ALREADY RUNNING A DYNAMIC ROOT OF TRUST *)
if getLOCK(pf_state) = false then
(
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(* DISABLE INTERRUPTS *)
let s0’=setINT(pf_state,cpuAccess, false) in
(* UPDATE THE LOCK *)
let s0 = setLOCK(s0’, cpuAccess, true) in
(* RESET THE PCR *)
(* DESIRED CODE: *)
(* new nonce; *)
(* CLASSIC ABSTRACTION THAT RUNS FASTER: NONCES ARE A FUNCTION OF THEIR CONTEXT *)
let nonce = fnonce((drt_init,drt_pp, getSTM(pf_state))) in
out(cpu_tpm, (pcr_reset_request, nonce, s0));
in(cpu_tpm, (=pcr_reset_response,=nonce,s1));
(* EXTEND THE PCR WITH THE MEASUREMENT *)
let measurement = (h(drt_init),h(getSTM(pf_state))) in
out(cpu_tpm, (pcr_extend_request, nonce, s1, measurement));
in(cpu_tpm, (=pcr_extend_response, =nonce,s2));
(* LOAD DRT_INIT AND ESTABLISH TPM CHANNELS *)
let s3 = setINIT(s2,cpuAccess, drt_init) in
out(cpu_tpm, (ext_channel, tpm_ch(drt_init)));
let entry_init = getENTRY(drt_init) in
out(entry_init, (drt_request, nonce, s3, tpm_ch(drt_init), drt_pp));
(* THE drt_init PROGRAM HAS MEASURED AND SET UP THE drt_pp PROGRAM*)
in(entry_init, (=drt_response, =nonce, new_state));
(* SETUP TPM CHANNELS FOR THE LOADED DRT_PP *)
let entry_pp = getENTRY(getPP(new_state)) in
out(entry_pp, (drt_start, new_state, tpm_ch(program(entry_pp))));
out(cpu_tpm, (ext_channel, tpm_ch(program(entry_pp))))
).
(*
THE TWO EQUATIONS BELOW TOGETHER WITH THE CACHE PROCESS ARE A CONSEQUENCE OF
cache, flush_smi,flush_stm EQUATIONS. WRITING THEM EXPLICITLY HELPS PROVERIF
TERMINATE 5 MINUTES FASTER
*)
reduc setSTM (state(x1,x2,x3,smram(y1,y2)),cpuAccess,value) =
state(x1,x2,x3,smram(value,y2)).
reduc setSMIH(state(x1,x2,x3,smram(y1,y2)),cpuAccess,value) =
state(x1,x2,x3,smram(y1,value)).
let CACHE = ( in(os, (pf_state,xsmi));
let new_state = setSMIH(pf_state,cpuAccess, xsmi) in
out(os, new_state) )
|
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( in(os,(pf_state,xstm));
if getLOCK(pf_state) = false then
let new_state = setSTM(pf_state,cpuAccess,xstm) in
out(os, new_state) ).
private fun expected_init/0.
let EXPECTED_INIT = out(os, program(expected_init));
(* RECEIVE DRT_PP AND TPM ACCESS FROM THE CPU *)
in(expected_init, (=drt_request, nonce0, pf_state, tpmc, drt_pp));
(* MEASURE AND EXTEND DRT_PP INTO THE PCR *)
let measurement = h(drt_pp) in
(* DESIRED CODE: *)
(* new nonce; *)
(* CLASSIC ABSTRACTION THAT RUNS FASTER: NONCES ARE A FUNCTION OF THEIR CONTEXT *)
let nonce = fnonce(drt_pp) in
out(tpmc, (pcr_extend_request,nonce, pf_state, measurement));
in(tpmc, (=pcr_extend_response,=nonce, ext_state));
(* LOAD DRT_PP ON THE PLATFORM STATE *)
let new_state = setPP(ext_state,expected_init, drt_pp) in
(* PASS THE CONTROL BACK TO THE CPU *)
out(expected_init, (drt_response, nonce0, new_state));
(* MAKE THE NEW PLATFORM STATE PUBLIC *)
out(os, new_state).
private fun expected_pp/0.
let EXPECTED_PP = (* DECRYPT A SEALED BLOB, RELYING ON COMMUNICATION WITH TPM*)
out(os, program(expected_pp));
in(expected_pp, (=drt_start,pf_state0,tpmc));
(* RE-ENABLE INTERRUPTS *)
let pf_state = setINT(pf_state0,expected_pp,true) in
out(os,pf_state);
(* UNSEAL THE KEY AND DECRYPT THE PRIVATE MESSAGE *)
in(os,xSealedBlob); in(os,xEncBlob);
out(tpmc,(tag_unseal,xSealedBlob));
in(tpmc,(=tag_plain,xSymKey));
let xMessage = sdec(xSymKey,xEncBlob) in
out(os,xMessage);
(* ENDING THE EXECUTION: THE LOCK IS SET TO FALSE AND THE PCR VALUE IS DESTROYED *)
(*new nonce; *)
(* ABSTRACTION THAT RUNS FASTER *)
let nonce = fnonce(drt_pp) in
out(tpmc, (pcr_extend_request, nonce, pf_state, zero));
in(tpmc, (=pcr_extend_response, =nonce, ext_state));
let end_state = setLOCK(ext_state,expected_pp,false) in
out(os,end_state).
let TPM = !TPM_RESET | !TPM_EXTEND | !TPM_UNSEAL.
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let TPM_RESET = let (channel, reset_type) = (cpu_tpm,pd) in !PCR_RESET |
let (channel, reset_type) = (os,ps) in !PCR_RESET.
let PCR_RESET = in(channel, (=pcr_reset_request, nonce, pf_state));
let new_state = resetPCR(pf_state,tpmAccess,reset_type) in
out(channel, (pcr_reset_response, nonce, new_state)).
let TPM_EXTEND = let channel = os in !PCR_EXTEND_BOUND |
let channel = cpu_tpm in !PCR_EXTEND_BOUND |
!in(cpu_tpm, (=ext_channel, channel)); !PCR_EXTEND_BOUND.
let PCR_EXTEND = in(channel, (=pcr_extend_request,nonce,pf_state,value));
let new_state = extendPCR(pf_state,tpmAccess,value) in
out(channel, (pcr_extend_response,nonce,new_state)).
let PCR_EXTEND_BOUND =
in(channel, (=pcr_extend_request,nonce,pf_state,value));
let pcr = getPCR(pf_state) in
if isSMALL(pcr)=true then
PCR_EXTEND_SMALL else PCR_EXTEND_BIG.
let PCR_EXTEND_SMALL
= let new_state = extendPCR(pf_state,tpmAccess,value) in
out(channel, (pcr_extend_response,nonce,new_state)).
let PCR_EXTEND_BIG
=
out(os,(pcr,val)); in(os,new_pcr);
if isBIG(new_pcr)=true then
let new_state = setPCR(pf_state,tpmAccess,new_pcr) in
out(channel, (pcr_extend_response,nonce,new_state)).
let TPM_UNSEAL = in(os, (=tag_unseal, pf_state, blob));
let value = unseal(blob, getPCR(pf_state)) in
if getLOCK(pf_state) = true then
( let channel = tpm_ch(getPP(pf_state)) in
out(channel, (tag_plain, value)) )
else
out(os, (tag_plain, value)).
(* QUERIES *)
(*A. THE EXPECTED STATE HAS BEEN REACHED *)
query attacker:state(tpm(h((h((pd,(h(program(expected_init)),h(program(expected_stm))))),
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h(program(expected_pp))))), cpu(true,x),
drt(program(expected_init),program(expected_pp),true),
smram(program(expected_stm),program(y))).
(* QUERY RESULT: PROVERIF RETURNS AN ATTACK TRACE THAT CAN BE INSPECTED FOR VALIDITY *)
(*B. THE PROTECTED PROGRAM SUCCESFULLY DECRYPTS THE PRIVATE
MESSAGE USING THE SEALED KEY AND MAKES IT PUBLIC*)
query attacker:hello_pp.
(* QUERY RESULT: PROVERIF RETURNS AN ATTACK TRACE THAT CAN BE INSPECTED FOR VALIDITY *)
(*C. WHENEVER THE EXPECTED PCR IS SET,
THE PLATFORM HAS THE EXPECTED STATE *)
query attacker:state( tpm(h((h((pd,(h(program(expected_init)),
h(program(expected_stm))))),h(program(expected_pp))))),
cpu(x,y),drt(xi,xp,true),
smram(xstm,xsmih))
==> (xi,xp,xstm)=(program(expected_init),program(expected_pp),program(expected_stm)).
(*QUERY RESULT: TRUE => THE ASSERTION IS VALID*)
(*D. THE ATTACKER DOES NOT HAVE ACCESS TO THE SEALED KEY *)
query attacker:k_pp.
(* QUERY RESULT: TRUE => THE ATTACKER DOES NOT HAVE k_pp *)
(* THE MAIN PROCESS *)
free null.
private fun expected_stm/0.
private free k_pp. (* SECRET KEY WHICH SHOULD ONLY BE KNOWN BY THE PROTECTED PROGRAM *)
private free hello_pp. (* PRIVATE MESSAGE ENCRYPTED WITH k_pp *)
process (* ENCRYPTED PRIVATE MESSAGE FOR PP *)
out(os,senc(k_pp,hello_pp));
(*ASSUME THAT THE BLOB SEALING THE SECRET KEY IS PUBLIC*)
out(os,seal(h((h((pd,(h(program(expected_init)),h(program(expected_stm))))),h(program(expected_pp)))),k_pp));
out(os, program(expected_stm));
(* INITIAL STATE LOADED UPON A SYSTEM RESET *)
in(os,(xInitStm,xInitSmih));
out(os, state(tpm(ps),cpu(true,null),drt(null,null,false),smram(xInitStm,xInitSmih)));
(* REQUESTING A DYNAMIC ROOT OF TRUST WITH ANY LOADED PROGRAMS *)
in(os, drt_init); in(os,drt_pp); in(os,pf_state);
out(os, (drt_request, drt_init, drt_pp, pf_state));
(*EXECUTING THE DRT PROCESSES *)
( !DRT_CPU | !CACHE | !EXPECTED_INIT | !EXPECTED_PP | TPM)
